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## From Make America Great Again to Make America Alone: Understanding Trump 2.0 World's Mathematics

Rana Danish Nisar <sup>1</sup> Tariq Rahim <sup>2</sup>



**Abstract:** Since Donald Trump was re-elected to the White House, his 'Make America Great Again' political slogan seems to isolate the United States further from the world stage. This article answers the question of what will Donald Trump's second presidency do to America's relations with those countries that participated in the constituting of the United States of America after World War II. Trump's "America First" policy seeks nationalist foreign policy goals and gives them preference over multilateral agreements. Consequently, Trump's self-serving US foreign policy of Trumped-up American exceptionalism sans partnerships, NATO, and EU, will ultimately reduce US global power and influence. In this case, the statement that America played a substantial role in shifting from global talk to national do constitutes a central idea in the shift of global leadership to a national focus. This could result in weakening the US influence in international affairs. As the region readjusts its geopolitical allies in response to the US, China and Russia will expand their stakes in the region. Furthermore, Western countries in general, and EU countries in particular, will answer to Trump's impetuous foreign policy by making separate economic partnerships, and new security alliances and cutting their dependence on trade with the United States. The isolation of America under Trump presents critical challenges to global security and risks setting back the international order the United States pursued throughout his entire tenure, since the end of World War II.

**Key Words:** Trump 2.0, America Exceptionalism, Trade War, Global Politics, American Isolation

### Introduction

The comeback of Donald J. Trump as a formidable political force in American political discourse has, beyond the controversial statements against the liberal international order and globalist institutions fueled by the very same values that Donald J. Trump represents. He emerged under the patronage of Make America Great Again (MAGA) in 2016, widely viewed by many as a rebuke to the tide of globalization, elite diplomacy, and multilateralism. (Schleusener, 2021). The American foreign policy slowly but surely turned into nationalism, while discarding decades of the liberal internationalism that has characterized American diplomacy since (and by) both big parties (Kimmage, 2025). As the present trajectory of Trump 2.0 looks more and more likely, analysts explain the transformation of the MAGA concept into an even more isolationist doctrine: Make America Alone. This is not a word trick, but it is important for the implications of redirecting the rhetorical cannon for the U.S. speculation and action in the referring international system. This new variant of Trumpism is not so independent and unrelated. Such ill liberal and international institutions' discouragement is within a much larger, global popular revolt. Namely, the pandemic, breakdown of transatlantic consensus, tensions with China, and technological turbulence, are already taking place that is shaking the post-Cold War order (Tung et al., 2023). Therefore, in terms of what Trump 2.0 is truly about, it is certainly not about just a new style of leadership, but could normatively really be a different order. It is by way of an emanating mindset for this understanding of the taboo

<sup>1</sup> Assistant Professor, School of Governance and Society, University of Management and Technology (UMT), Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan. Email. ✉ [danish.nisar@umt.edu.pk](mailto:danish.nisar@umt.edu.pk)

<sup>2</sup> Assistant Professor, School of Governance and Society, University of Management and Technology (UMT), Lahore, Punjab, Pakistan. ✉ [tariq.rahim@umt.edu.pk](mailto:tariq.rahim@umt.edu.pk)

- **Corresponding Author:** Tariq Rahim (✉ [tariq.rahim@umt.edu.pk](mailto:tariq.rahim@umt.edu.pk))
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transition in the world, in which America breaks the basic tenets of international cooperation and norm-based order.

Intentional violation of diplomatic standards (Cordall, [2025](#)), refusal of former allies, and unilateralism in the tangled world like now are tangibly the most important parts of world taboo. Trumpism in the second phase may be unlike the traditional accusations of foreign policy as being imperialistic or making the US overreach in the world; in doing that America will encourage others to take the space rather than fill it as expected, with some of them having very different value systems. Therefore, it is, like Make America Alone, marginalization undertaken voluntarily, in the name of patriotic rhetoric. In truth, this new configuration is adored by the populist base of Trump in the name of going back to sovereignty and self-determination (Lacatus, [2021](#)). For such people, global agreements deprive nations of their will to make their own decisions, while multilateralism undermines national will. This is with Trump 2.0 and there is a good chance this becomes a further decoupling of the United States from global responsibilities in other areas — climate deals, arms control pacts, migration covenants, and global health collaboration (Parkinson, [2025](#)). But these are acts that satisfy domestic political constituencies, they don't make America stand out for who we are and what we do for the world, and they certainly don't make us a reluctant leader, we are instead becoming an unpredictable outlier. Therefore, this writing tries to fit Trump 2.0 into an American conception of internationalism as much as understanding his policy. By this, you would be mapping out how that rearrangement of the pieces would play itself out through alliances, geoeconomics, diplomacy, security architectures, and normative leadership.

Voluntary estrangement by a great power from the world which it has voluntarily interpreted looks like such. Both questions lead to the question to finally address: How great does America want to be and would it rather stand alone than strive to make her great? Moving forward, In this present piece of writing, it is explores how Donald Trump's U.S. foreign policy has been and will be in a say of where it can lead the country, particularly in his second term, and what future it holds for American global leadership and managing with the world affairs. It starts off with a rhetorical yes and no: Is the free world lost without America, or is America lost without the free world? This question instigates the crucial linkage between the U.S. and its global allies in a world governed by the post-WWII order in which the U.S. has been the leading power and the stabilizer. Trump has become much more radical when it comes to domestic and foreign policy since returning to his office. Among the other policies changed by Donald Trump so far in the initial few months of his presidency, have been his foreign policies, which made America's allies rethink their strategies and responses. In addition to that, Trump has challenged trade deals, and threatened tariffs against closest allies like the European Union and Canada, and it seems the U.S. is retreating from international commitments and institutions (Mes & Valero, [2025](#)). Furthermore, his policies, including taking a stance in support of U.S. withdrawal from conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Ukraine, are causing questions as to whether America's actions and agendas attest to its place in global order (Hossain, [2025](#)).

The article critiques several key aspects of Trump's foreign policy, such as his stance on the war in Ukraine and his relationship with authoritarian regimes like Russia. Trump's foreign policy has changed radically, thoroughly reversing the United States' stance toward such countries as Russia and North Korea and alienating many of the traditional Western allies it has long cooperated with. For example, on the resolution against Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. and Europe are becoming more and more apart, and this is demonstrated by Trump's comments at the UN, where he sided with Russia instead. That is precisely his reasoning: the war in Ukraine is better to Europe than to the U.S., which is in line with his American puritanism favoring separation and disengagement from Europe. Trump has added to the problem with his proposal of gold card schemes that allow wealthy people, including maybe Russian oligarchs, to pay \$5 million to gain U.S. residency (Solomon, [2025](#)). It represents Trump's transactional method of conducting international relations, considering economic power and loyalty to be the main priorities rather than the common democratic values and alliances. The writing also examines the deteriorating losses of faith between the U.S. and its closest allies. Polls suggest that most countries including Canada are fundamentally rethinking the way America is viewed as an ally, and now turn it into an enemy (Solomon, [2025](#)). The writing conveys the U.S. in Trump's image that is increasingly alone among the world's partners in peacekeeping, troops on the ground, and policing the world, and which is looking

for ways to acquire the world by a more muscly, unilateral approach (Solomon, [2025](#)). The article warns that as the United States retreats from being the guarantor of international stability, the world may be heading to a time where power struggles will deepen, alliances will be more broken down, and global rules will be diluted, making the United States swim through a much more unstable and fragmented world order. The most important question, therefore, regardless of the U.S. public's political stance in deciding between Democrats or a Republican as president, is whether the U.S. can still be a reliable ally, or whether it will become a single superpower without a global network that can rely on it (Solomon, [2025](#)).

### **Theoretical Mapping**

The change from the MAGA slogan to the more isolationist meaning behind 'Make America Alone' shows the extent of Donald Trump's U.S. foreign policy flip. The best way to explain this shift is the Neoclassical Realism theory of International Relations (IR) which blends the structural logic of Realism with domestic factors like leadership perception, nationalism, and public opinion. Neoclassical Realism is able to explain Trump's worldview and his creation of the '2.0 taboo' that defies the liberal international order through a combination of systemic pressures and unit-level variables. Yes, this essay explains the central precepts of Neoclassical Realism and uses them to falsify the myth of Trump's departure from the international scene, demonstrating instead that he is asserting power on a new and domestic level, derived from national identity and national interest.

Gideon Rose together with other scholars founded Neoclassical Realism which explains state foreign policy development through interactions between international system factors and national political influences (Rose, [1998](#)). Through Neoclassical Realism, theorists enhance Structural Realism by adding domestic variables that include leaders' conceptual frameworks and strategic traditions as well as institutional structures and public actions in order to explain the process by which international factors transform into concrete foreign policies (Rose, [1998](#)). States possess the capacity to implement particular strategies from their available resources yet they might not enact them because internal factors or leader decision-making gets in the way. Leaders also sometimes misperceive threats – when joined with beliefs, past history, and political decision-making. Whereas the constituents of perception with power determine which ideas meet with political reality (Rose, [1998](#)).

Trump's foreign policy derives from the fact that he regarded American hegemony as having declined systematically and simultaneously (Alonso-Trabanco, [2025](#)) and imposed domestic policies of nationalism and populism (Cisneros-Tirado & Babbili, [2022](#)). The new foreign policy of Trump's administration is an example of the adaptation of power politics and America first rather than surrender when it makes choices that combine the politics of power with emphasis on national sovereignty economic nationalism and unilateralism (Matthews, [2024](#)). Neoclassical Realism Theory, Strategic Reinterpretation of priority by leaders rather than irrational actions for this behavior. Trump said international groups tied the hands of America while he regarded them as barriers to its power because trumps want the government more centralized and based on personal outlook (Dunne, [2025](#)). With his creation of the “America First” in addition to the “Make America Great” white flag he mingled to display this great vision differentiated against national power along with scores of independence from far-reaching foreign duties.

U.S. worldwide power primacy appears to falter due to China's economic surge and before the tariff, the economy of the dragon is already risen as well as Europe's disunity as well as relentless strife in addition to the Middle East which generate worldwide security worries (Douglas, [2025](#); Walt, [2025](#); Brumberg, [2025](#)). Trump reacted to changing international structures by conducting power retrenchment; withdrawing from commitments, and increasing the price that is set for allied contribution. The great powers significantly especially reevaluate their strategies when conditions change in power dynamics according to Neoclassical Realism arguments; domestic political instructions consider the shift as change. The press signal phrase "Trump's 2.0 World Taboo" describes the gross fact that Trump breached the existing norms and liberal presumptions that describe the global order – or international system – implicit in a reportorial tradition on global internal affairs. However, from a neorealist perspective, Trump's moves were not unthinkable but predictable answers to homegrown populist woes and structural decline.

The trade war by Trump against China and the EU is in favor of economic sovereignty views instead of isolation as a policy (Waleed, [2025](#)). His method of dealing with North Korea involved inexplicable



diplomatic efforts because he hoped to break out of multilateral networks through bilateral leader contacts reflecting his conviction about executive power domino. In this regard, from a Neoclassical Realism viewpoint what liberal theorists refer to as norm violations is internal political power shuffling made to reflect changes they believe are occurring around the globe. The refusal of the tradition by President Trump reflects his reconfiguration of American power beyond the elite norms even when it is built around American interests. According to Neoclassical Realist analysis, a change in Trump's foreign policy philosophical beliefs, from Nationalist Greatness to geopolitical Self-reliance, shows strategic change resulting from both international and domestic conditions. The presidential example shows why the domestic character of a nation such as populism and nationalism androgenic characteristics of leaders in the foreign policy explanations must account for. Neoclassical Realism analysis allows us to overcome superficial assessments and gain an understanding of actual geopolitical playbook mechanics in American 21st-century foreign policy.

### **The Making of a Giant: The American Legacy of Power**

The United States started its existence as an exceptional country with its people believing they had specific goals for history and a special connection to divine powers. American teachings about political leaders from Alexis de Tocqueville showed the U.S. stands unique among other countries because it controls democracy better with liberal beliefs. The new country built its national identity through Enlightenment principles plus frontier beliefs. During its early phase, manifest destiny showed exceptionalism as it expressed that expanding westward was irreversible and ethically sound. During the 19th century, America grew from its role as a local power into a rising world power. The Industrial Revolution made the United States achieve strong economic progress that led European nations in production and technology. The United States economy and border growth continued at full speed after the Civil War despite temporary national unity issues during it. The United States joined global issues in 1898 through the Spanish-American War which made them take control of foreign lands and expand their naval operations. American interests reached beyond its borders to become an international power as its growth evolved (Offner, [1998](#)).

During World War I the United States gained its first chance to make an immediate impact on European countries. The nation's participation lasted only a short period yet made a great difference. During his presidency, Wilson worked to create a League of Nations yet failed within the United States which showcased America's growing global leadership desires. After World War II started clear evidence showed that the United States had become a dominant global power (Hunter, [1985](#)). With Europe and Asia damaged by years of fighting the United States kept its soil safe while staying economically strong. When the Bretton Woods institutions began operations along with the UN under U.S. supervision the nation secured its economic and political control and set up permanent rules for global relations.

Between 1947 and 1991 the Cold War showed how America wanted global power and fought Soviet Union ideals. The world split into two sides after World War II made the United States dominate the nations devoted to free principles. Through NATO and military partnerships alongside the Marshall Plan and military defenses, the United States built a powerful position to push back communist forces and create more markets for capitalism and liberal democracy (White, [1987](#)). Despite the Vietnam War becoming a major military and political problem the US still led global affairs and considered a misadventure in US history (Morgenthau, [1968](#)). When the Soviet Union fell the United States led all nations as the sole dominant power. The American nation experienced unmatched leadership across all sectors during the 1990s following the Cold War. The United States ruled international markets through technological advancement, financial centers, and open international trade policies. Through worldwide entertainment media, teaching systems, and business influence the nation established cultural soft power. During these conflicts, the United States strengthened its position as a worldwide police force by taking action in military engagement. The Clinton administration promoted worldwide capitalism by joining the Eastern Bloc nations to global trade markets and extending NATO's territory (Miller, [1994](#); O'Byrne, [1997](#)). The moment of September 11, 2001, created a new direction for America in global affairs. After September 11 the War on Terror expanded US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq while demonstrating important weaknesses. During the early 2000s United States foreign policy featured unilateral approaches while adopting the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive war which started concerns about American expansion (Anghie & Hill, [2004](#)). Despite facing new challenges the United States kept its exceptional military strength and



economic influence. Global financial institutions started criticizing free-market economic systems after 2008 when America faced severe economic problems.

Under President Obama, the United States shifted its policy to prioritize Asia while working with other nations and searching for diplomatic deals with Iran (Rahawestri, [2010](#); Larrabee, [2009](#)). The United States adjusted its leadership style because multiple powers now shaped the world order. After China and Russia grew stronger and Middle East conflicts emerged other nations started to limit what the United States could do. The United States managed to stay in charge of key technological and defense partnerships plus global institutions though its position started softening.

During his time in office (2017–2021), Donald Trump shifted United States foreign policy toward a non-conforming direction. During his presidential term, Trump declared America First and Make America Great Again to reject the liberal internationalism that defined US overseas supremacy. Through his refusal to support international pacts like the Paris Climate Accord and the Iran nuclear deal and by using a deal-oriented diplomatic method he emanated withdrawal from global leadership (Zhang et al., [2017](#)). Despite its dominance, the United States lost its position as a global leader through international doubt about its direction. The COVID-19 pandemic intensified worldwide questions about American abilities to lead both domestically and internationally. The Biden administration works to re-establish alliances along with taking a leading role in international climate change and democratic principles decisions (Ikenberry, [2022](#)). The operational circumstances have undergone substantial changes. The strategic position of power has changed since China intensified its technological drive alongside Russia becoming more aggressive. International relations have evolved into a more complex system because of the Ukraine conflict combined with rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait along with energy and shipment chains being weaponized. Because of changing world political priorities and realignments in 2023, the United States exists as a superpower with declining international challenges to its position. However, the US's unique international role has deteriorated as a result of internal strife alongside emerging global market competitors and doubt in its continued global leadership role. The lasting effects of American power from revolutionary beginnings to dominant global status influence contemporary international standards, organizational structures, and intellectual confrontations. US influence still evolves without any diminution of its traditional influence the latter that remains firmly rooted in the singular experience in historical unipolarity of US power.

### **The Ideological Core of 'Make America Alone'**

From sheer principles that depart completely from the traditional American exceptionalist doctrines, Trump's view for his second presidential tenure took shape. The initial MAGA campaign was about the past era of excellence in America, while his current agenda is to completely break all foreign partnerships in the context of tariffs (Ziwen & Bermingham, [2025](#)). This ideology leads to a nationalist stance that in the end vilifies isolationist action with 'deal-based' foreign policy and strong opposition to world institutions. The main conclusion of this theory is that America has no other choice than protecting itself alone and many other nations have been ineffective. According to Trumpian ideological terms, the United States should use allies to create international value through both corporate activity and international law and multilateralism, but liberal internationalists maintain that these systems constrain American power. There are costs involved in being a member of NATO (Kube et al., [2025](#)), where having membership of the UN incurs no value, environmental agreements are damaging to employment prospects and international trade agreements are economic wrecking tools (Mason & Nichols, [2025](#); Ellickson, [2025](#)). Trumpian reasoning allows foreign countries to abuse U.S. generosity by duplicating its actions because of institutions. From this perspective, there is no win-win scenario as cooperation serves as a viable option yet alliances require the calculation of profits against costs and every international norm can be discarded. In foreign policy decision-making Trump rarely considers moral aspects in his strategic calculations. Sovereignty and dealing with power remain the main priorities of current measures. Such realistic thinking eliminates the traditional differences between friendly and hostile relationships. Previously, Trump preferred to connect with powerful world leaders such as Putin Kim, and Xi before the COVID outbreak began thus he dismissed all other diplomatic channels as unimportant. The ideological reconstruction by isolationist forces extends into a gradual shift that questions the basic assumptions for postwar U.S. leadership. Additionally, the ideological cornerstone of Make America Alone includes domestic elements



of expanded projectionism. Due to this, foreign policy is only evaluated according to its influence on domestic political triumph. Trump's implementation of the border control policies, trade war measures, and immigration restrictions have had more to do with testing ideological devotion to Trump's nativism than seeking to safeguard the nation. To be set apart from world responsibilities to be a struggling power, it fails to regain its ill-gotten glories of the past. As a result, it is difficult to detect the presence of collective security with reference to the framework of power abuse. Even to this day, the America First position in itself lacks intellectual backing as to how political boundaries are being shattered. The withdrawal of funding to the World Health Organization namely, along with the supporting an abandonment of the Paris Climate Accord represents acts of righteous self-liberation, not irregularities (House, [2025](#); Pullins & Knijnenburg, [2025](#)).

### **The Collapse of Global Alliances and the Rise of Strategic Ambiguity**

The "Make America Alone" policy is most aligned with clear historical principles that guide global institutions which have led to the most open and ready breakdown of international trust in global partnerships. The second term edition of Trump's vision accelerates the breakup of any and all kinds of international organization structure. The new administration puts its web of alliances to become handpicked business transactions, and their vague strategic exchange makes stable commitments, not the rule anymore. The structural transition of this problem is beyond semantics and will create problems that will hinder NATO and G7 international partnerships as well as bilateral defense partnerships and reinforce adversary positions while weakening alliances. Donald Trump represented NATO's worst period during his first presidential term. It is possible that participants would support potential future presidential leadership with certain demands. Over the course of years, Trump boasted about NATO providing no value and criticized other members of NATO for spending too much on the military before seeming to come out in support of American withdrawal from the organization (Durbin, [2024](#)). Reciprocity, Trump's action is criticized by the chief of NATO that Trump's decision can hit the security of the members. It is a framework that allows alliances to be based on conditions that it exists as a dour object of condemnation. All fundamental trust elements upon which nations unite to answer collectively to defense are struck by this tactic. As a result of these strategic events, France, Germany, and Canada have been driven to considerations of changing their undertakings in a way that gradually weakens NATO's deterrent force.

Moving forward, the related weaknesses in the alignments between the United States on the one hand, and South Korea, and on the other hand with Japan are present. U.S. alliances might become diminished or revenue-driven status as a result of the Trump doctrine in the present. Instead of drawing solutions, such internal instabilities along with dangerous proposals to reduce troop numbers point towards uncertain times. The United States withdrawal from the role as a traditional security provider promotes the regional actors to investigate local military expansion and Chinese diplomatic relations, leading to disturbances in Asian strategic balance (Chen & An, [2025](#)). Economic cooperation among G7 members no longer gives the institution enough functional effect, and it has shrunk because of less of a presence (O'Neill, [2017](#)). Such a view as if Russia could recover its place among friends after annexing Crimea makes many Americans angry, as they regard the contempt of the administration towards common democratic values. As their group cohesion fractures down the principle of shared principles, their capacity to deal with cross-border problems, including management of the climate change crisis, pandemic response, and digital governance is reduced. Furthermore, it assists America in addressing the problem of its perennial emptiness from consensus-based organizations as these growing institutions are the domain of other nations, which are striving to increase their economic power, like China. Before Trump 2.0 took office, strategic ambiguity was used in a diplomatic sense, whereas now it is the default operational requirement. U.S. actions were difficult to predict during the withdrawal from JCPOA and in an effort to make friends with North Korea, and the world's security calculations were shaped as a result. U.S. actions that no one could foresee would discourage some opponents from attacking, but constant instability would overextend America's global reputation in diplomacy.

America's behavior is erratic, and therefore, we inspire distrust in other allies, confidence among opponents sufficient enough to cause provocation in more than proportion towards their disadvantage along with providing countries not involved an option of choosing whether to side with power poles or hedge their security. Changes in the existing international climate have led to the break up of the previous

intelligence-sharing consortiums as is the case of 'Five Eyes' working in harmony. The modern surveillance accusations, the unilateral intelligence sharing model, and the one-sided approaches are eventually shattering the bases of strategic partnerships. Suspecting the behavior of climate pacts, a trade agreement, and a health governance arrangement is detrimental to American engagement in non-conventional security cooperative activities. COVID-19 is yet another illuminating example of the United States choosing independence from any kind of help for the global alliances as well as monopolizing its vaccine, which both are the justifications for its old trends. The new global power dynamics follow the substitution of vague statements for clear direction and the substitution of monetary deals in place of partnerships. Safety is less assured by strength because there is nothing to imply that strength serves as a form of protection.

### **America's Image in Global Public Consciousness under Trump 2.0**

Through many years, America has created imagery in contradiction, pretending its power and democracy, human rights, and liberal global governance. 'Trumpism' poses an imminent danger of ending the global perception of the USA as a leader of the world becoming a secluded and inconsistent power (Patrick, [2025](#)). However, at the beginning Trump's "Make America Great Again" slogan may have been considered a domestically focused but acceptable argument, but afterward, it was just "Make America Alone" with only Trump's self-centered political behavior that might destroy the concept of America across the world and seems the alarming situation for liberal international world order (Plant, [2025](#); Rielly, [2025](#)). With Trump 2.0 America is likely to lose its international recognition in a relentless, debilitating way. The ability to influence through attractiveness are significant soft power capability, that is able to hamper their influence while remaining pleasant to others; since these have been eroded, U.S. soft power capabilities come back down (Sobel, [2025](#)). Pew Research Center poll or other international polling agency repeat polls have shown tracking quite clearly how major US allies like Canada and Germany, even the UK, Japan, and Australia have grown less favorable towards our country and this continued to be observed during Trump's second time of office for a whole four years. There is no America First because America Only policies didn't need a diplomat and the USA became a rogue global entity. Beyond perception, America now presents itself to others through the image that illustrates beyond a doubt, the presence of such issues within its own institutional structure.

With the completion of Trump's first term, American symbolic guardianship ended, and Trump's leadership turned to various multilateral agreements from the Paris Climate Accords, to UNESCO, and the WHO membership accords. Potential repeat behavior under Trump during his second presidential period will make America lose its position as a dependable international ally as well as make America lose its moral standing. These instances of events further solidify the fact that America has unpredictable reactions towards global emergencies such as pandemics, natural disasters, or forced population displacements, which makes the Global South nations refrain from connecting America as a guiding weather station for the rest of the world. Furthermore, the situation is worsened if Trump keeps taking such attitudes later on, since Trump 2.0 may provoke statements about hostility to immigration cultural pluralism, and civil liberties that may separate America and leave it isolated from the external world (Hackman, [2025](#); Kamarck & Galston, [2025](#)). It seems that the fall of liberal standards would turn America into an unpleasant case study of democratic decay to the rest of the world. However, America reflects in its bars a political landscape of fake information, unwelcome ideas, and beliefs, which are close to its official diplomatic principles under this ominous view but China, Russia, and Iran also see Trump 2.0 as a damaging public reputation that could give them an important strategic opening. They have the opportunity to depict American democracy as both dysfunctional and hypocritical, thereby enhancing their image as competent authoritarian figures. Images of racial disturbances and political gridlock in the US regularly appear on Chinese state media to undermine supporters of liberal democracy. The re-election of Trump as president would bolster the claims of Chinese media and would further weaken the U.S.'s ability to advocate an international standard of governance.

Trump 2.0 as the leader would most likely utilize digital diplomacy and international media to further create a marginal division among global partisans through sensational propaganda. Trump bypassed traditional diplomatic practices when dealing with foreign affairs through social media. His opponents continue to be excited while everything from his allies and his diplomatic alliances remains puzzled while




the global public watches through his miscommunicated verbalizations. Trump's latest Statecraft image causes the rest of the world to regard America as a great power with uncertain and inexplicable behavior. The United States no longer has the moral prestige that it enjoyed in U.S. foreign relations in the past where strategic mistrust has replaced that.

### Economic Nationalism and Trade Retrenchment in a Globalized Era

In his first term in political office (Trump 1.0) and in his almost certain second term (Trump 2.0), Donald Trump's nationalist approach to economics continues to be a feature in emphasizing domestic economic policy and rejecting international agreement on economic issues. Too Late First" became Trump's approach as president through aggressive strategies that fought against global trade deals while showing hostile behavior towards international economic integration. Economic nationalism advocated by Trump 2.0 makes it difficult to understand the methods through which the United States will rebuild global economic governance by undoing previous trade relationships. American interests suffered from unfair foreign trade deals that combined outsourcing with high barriers to imports sent to the United States. All global markets experienced chaos after Trump 2.0 officially announced unilateral trade tariffs together with Chinese trade duties and renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement into the USMCA.

**Figure 1**


*USA-China Tariff Rates Towards Each Other*



Source: (Bown, 2025)

**Figure 2**

*Percent of US-China Trade Subject to Trade War Tariffs*



Source: (Bown, 2025)



Apart from 145% China’s tariff, the USA has risen tariffs on different countries and the following figures shows the show.

**Figure 3**  
Percent of US Trade War Tariffs

	Share of US imports	Previous rate	Updated total
European Union	18.5%	20%	10%
China	13.4%	34%	145%
Japan	4.5%	24%	10%
Vietnam	4.2%	46%	10%
South Korea	4%	25%	10%
Taiwan	3.6%	32%	10%
India	2.7%	26%	10%
UK	2.1%	10%	10%
Switzerland	1.9%	31%	10%
Thailand	1.9%	36%	10%
Malaysia	1.6%	24%	10%
Brazil	1.3%	10%	10%
Singapore	1.3%	10%	10%
Afghanistan	<1%	10%	10%

Source: (BBC, [2025](#))

In this new term presidential plan, Trump 2.0 will uphold his original direction yet he will focus more on ideological economic sovereignty and show less pragmatic tendencies. That economic downturn endangers the foundation of globalization while benefiting the United States throughout its historical growth. For several decades the global supply chain operated under free trade principles that were predominantly built by the US as its main builder. The planned assault on worldwide trade principles by Trump 2.0 would create domestic chaos for America while causing major turbulence in international economic activities (Edelberg & Obstfeld, [2024](#)). The lengthy adoption of this stance by Trump would cause the WTO to disappear completely due to its existing weakened state because he refused to choose appellate judges. The economic nationalism that was adopted by countries creates greater domestic problems because too many systems have been integrated across borders.

During the first presidential term of Donald Trump, China the European Union, and other trade partners responded by imposing retaliatory tariffs against which U.S. producers and household consumers, as well as agricultural sectors, find themselves unprotected. There is a delusion of self-independence when the nations go forward moving as if there are no relations between nations with respect to the availability of materials and technological know-how, manpower sources, etc. The logistical and financial barriers that the U.S. faces are too great to make it more economically attractive to move its semiconductor manufacturing plants from Asia, which would, in theory, help bring back U.S. manufacturing and support a reshoring industrial campaign. Similar to COVID-19, the rising tariffs will reciprocally the shortage of goods could actually cause problems with inflation along with supply chain problems and displeased customers related to this policy (Hyatt, [2025](#)). Trump's protectionist policy is then carried out through negative strong language which lays the blame for American job loss at the door of immigrants and foreign workers, as well as multinational corporations.

The foreign partnerships have been pushed away politically and all the domestic hostility to foreign elements in America has increased. At the same time, given that U.S. businesses will face multiple cross-border retaliatory trade restrictions, foreign investments in the United States become less attractive. The Isolatory and unilateral behavior of America may lead it to develop an economic closed-loop system which can lead to equal resistance from foreign partners (Buttigieg & Gordon, [2020](#)). American economic nationalism blocks its ability to challenge Chinese and other foreign competitors even as analysis shows



that it simultaneously does. The U.S. had left the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement due to its belief in high standards and curbing Chinese regional power (McBride et al., [2021](#)). Beijing is able to increase neighboring countries' cooperation with BRI and RCEP due to the U.S. loss in other international trade agreements, resulting in a lessening of American power projection against Chinese influence (Wu, [2022](#)).

### **Trumpism and the Crisis of Multilateralism**

With another presidential term, the Trumpite movement would intensify the hostility and crisis of multilateralism, i.e. global cooperation and institutional frameworks to normalize norms (Carnegie & Clark, [2024](#)). Modern history demonstrates that multilateralism has been the bedrock of modern U.S. foreign policy against the threat arising from the emerging authoritarian powers in the postwar era and the domestic U.S. elements. His transactional leadership style has removed U.S. backing for global governance checks on sovereignty in ways that are short, national, and nationalist. A second administration of President Trump, who had engineered institutional changes toward breaking international cooperation, would hasten global fragmentation at a record pace. For the multilateral project, there is a need to resolve global issues under unified action, which may include security-related issues, climate change prevention and economics, the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, the Middle Eastern crisis, and unpredicted pandemic response as well as other global challenges. Trump believes that cooperation with other countries should follow the rules of cost-benefit and the national interest must be prioritized above any joint effort with the international actor as he shows with a continuous series of public attacks on NATO and threats of separation from WHO as well as hatred of the United Nations.

America First eventually devolved into America Alone, resulting in undermining the trust of international organizations and providing a disservice to America's tradition of leading the world. With Trump in the second presidential term, there will be maximum disengagement, with overtly anti-global policies. Previously, in his entire term of office, Trump has continually ridiculed NATO, reminding that, under it, the US financial debt was lowered, which could indicate a significant withdrawal of America from multinational operations. When Eastern Europe is destabilized by such actions, the Western security structure suffers major damage while Russia gains considerable power. He has terminated the major arms control agreements including the INF Treaty and JCPOA although these represent both the most significant agreements for multinational security cooperation which he has done against personal political motives that damage international collaboration (Borger, [2019](#)). The multi-sided trade system has suffered secondary effects due to the policies implemented by Trump. Trump 2.0 should be understood as consolidating past policies of concluding unequal bilateral trade deals which would challenge global economic governance protocols. The established norms and institutions currently face a severe breakdown in their operations. Throughout his presidency, Trump gave weight to the claim that international norms limit the political control of states. Nationalist populist movements across Europe along with South America and parts of Asia show agreement with these beliefs and this creates widespread anti-globalism.

Multilateral agreements suffer step-by-step deterioration which produces both American foreign policy disengagement and reduced cooperation levels across the world. By adopting Trumpian policies outside the country the United States fights against the liberal system of worldwide governance built during World War II. A potential Trump return to Washington turns current threats to American multilateralism into reality by pushing allies to change their defense structures particularly the EU and open space for countries such as China or regional groupings. Under these conditions, it appears the American-led multilateral system would die alongside America's declining leadership power. The ongoing Trump-EU decline juxtaposition can push the EU towards possible other options like Russia and China as well (America Hernandez, [2025](#)).

### **Repercussions for Global Strategic Stability and Alliances**

A Trump presidency returning to power for a second term would create multiple distortions to worldwide stability by reshaping established partnerships and changing security networks around the world. Under his leadership, Trump would disturb global security structures because his international views reject long-held American standards for handling foreign issues. He believes real political practices drive the world and countries should work separately against each other internationally. Since NATO's Cold War security structure evolved meticulously it becomes vulnerable when any changes occur. People now doubt NATO's validity due to Trump's previous declaration of "obsolete" in this military alliance. When President Trump

served in his first term he ordered allies to obey 2% defense spending requirements by using demeaning language that undermined NATO's core defense commitments. The Trump administration might boost troop withdrawal amounts and create formal transaction-based alliances if voters support his next presidential term. By breaking up NATO Russia will get extra motivation to assert its power mainly over Eastern Europe and the Arctic regions. Strategic stability faces harm when these countries and the United States stand against one another. His reluctance to control weapons became apparent when he could not support the INF Treaty and showed limited interest in revising New START (Detsch, [2020](#)). He will likely keep developing aggressive weapons policies if he serves two terms without controlled disarmament agreements. When China grows its nuclear forces faster it could improve its military modernization while a growing distance between America and global partners may let Russia join China to defend against Western powers. The organizations and powers in the Indo-Pacific area create another test of how different sides align or realign.

Under Trump, the United States shifted toward a more successful Indo-Pacific strategy including backing for the QUAD and signed multiple security agreements including COMCASA, BECA, LEOMA, and ISA with its reliable defense partner India to counter the possible threats in wider Indo-Pacific (Nisar, 2023). While many other countries except India and Australia doubted Trump's unreliable actions (Frewen, [2025](#)). Under a Trump Revival presidency, this scene could be exaggerated by reducing diplomacy in Asia and demanding economic concessions while pulling back from group efforts. More regional distrust would push states to protect themselves through various security dealings and even developing domestic defensive programs including possible nuclear weapon development. The return of Trump would make people more confident in American security partnerships and cast doubt on their reliability. States with a typical alliance with the US will doubt their ongoing partnership assurance between them. The Gulf States may start to give more security support to Russia and China after finding current American alliances unreliable. European leaders especially from France and Germany want independence from U.S. world leadership to build stronger military protection structures (Ross & Nöstlinger, [2025](#)). The worldwide system aiming to limit nuclear proliferation would face harmful impacts from this. When U.S. allies within the nuclear protection zone doubt its security value they will investigate their own nuclear defense choices (Gawthorpe, [2025](#)).

The presence of hostile neighbors makes South Korea and Japan think about getting nuclear weapons to protect against declining American support (Romei, [2023](#)). Under Trump's potential comeback, the multilateral systems would face harm yet it could produce severe effects on how nations maintain peace worldwide. Trump's strong unilateral moves and opposition to alliances further weaken arms control systems and make international diplomatic organizations ineffective which brings global tensions forward sooner (Abbas, [2025](#)). When America withdraws to pursue national interests first the worldwide system will likely break up into self-contained regions resulting in increased instability security threats and reduced cooperation between them.

### **Domestic Polarization and Its Spillover Effects on Foreign Policy**

More profound for Trump's foreign policy than any other essential domestic trend is internal divisions within the United States. These continued disagreements within these discussions of government policy during the economic discussions continue to dominate US foreign cooperation and threaten its diplomatic authority. Diplomatic relations are maintained by the states when counterparts that do not follow the basic aims of the policy reveal political disagreement with each other. Throughout his tenure as a populist, Trump has leveraged these existing differences by converting the Republican citizen's worldview into a rigid binary between nationalistic views and revelations of the international bodies led by powerful global experts. There are political gains within the country, that discourage efforts to make international relations steady. Different administrations continually interfere with American foreign policy and thus make it hard to anticipate the direction and unfair to opponents of the same political sides. This problem has a direct effect on professional standards in diplomatic practices. Several career people with no diplomatic experience were used during Trump's presidency to fill diplomatic roles and to focus on personal allegiance to the priorities of the president (Gawel & Ham, [2018](#)). As they are political first, U.S. embassies and diplomatic negotiation teams will stop performing the basic functions of global trading platforms.

Diplomacy professionals who normally stabilize political shifts could stay permanently driven by politics which would make America lose its trusted diplomatic standing internationally. The changes in domestic politics create doubts among longtime allies about U.S. reliability because they trust U.S.



commitments less when they depend on presidential identity. The Paris Agreement commitments that the United States made under the Paris Agreement switched direction with Trump and then returned during Biden's presidency shows foreign partners they should not depend on U.S. stability. When America maintains different foreign policy positions for different situations it makes other nations earn trust less and encourages them to adapt strategies to protect against the U.S. role in the international community. The more enhanced division, the more empowerment to adversaries. Hybrid warfare experts from Russia and China took advantage of American internal conflicts to claim their strategic targets. Russian cyber-attacks against U.S. democracy came with deceptive media reports while China used media to create racial tensions between America and its allies (Nelson & West, 2024).


A second Trump presidency would have created perfect conditions for people who exploit divisions within our nation. Our previous discussion showed how trade problems began during this period of strong political divisiveness. Trump chose to tax his diplomatic partners in order to excite his voting core while weakening worldwide economic stability. Countries use various protectionist steps to make supply chains harder to operate launch countermeasures through periodic trade fights and attempt to weaken international trade institutions. During Trump's potential second term, his initial economic nationalism for America would become stronger with stricter trade policies to separate the United States from worldwide economic oversight. When political polarization grows it harms how Americans represent democracy to other nations (Harrison & Zammit, 2024). From its beginning the United States has shown itself to the world as an exceptional demonstration of liberal democracy but now the increasing political dysfunction, disinformation, and institutional brinkmanship compromise that narrative. The January 6<sup>th</sup> storming of the Capitol proved to the world that American democracy faces real stability risks (Williams, 2021). A Trump regime following his presidential re-endorsement will find it hard to promote democracy through foreign policy due to threats to US civil rights and reduced worldwide credibility.

### Global Reactions and Adaptive Responses to Trump's Return

A second term for Donald Trump will prompt multiple reactions worldwide with both defensive and offensive outcomes. Countries are planning ahead to shield themselves from future Trump foreign policy actions resulting from his major one-term changes to international relations. Countries worldwide would likely adjust their diplomatic strategy twice when Trump served a full second presidential term because his unpredictable handling of power influenced their approach to U.S. security engagements. European Asian and Middle Eastern allies of the United States will in all likelihood pursue diversified security plans. Germany France and Japan require American protection and must build new diplomatic connections because they see US leadership as unpredictable. Eager Eastern European NATO members will increase their own military security through partnerships beyond NATO which may create stronger ties with non-NATO nations such as Sweden or Finland and EU nations and they have decided to build an 800 billion euro defense wall for the EU (Tidey, 2025). Asian nations near China will seek their own defense programs by boosting military ties with Australia and India, while Japan and South Korea create missile protection systems. The following figures show the Chinese military juxtaposition towards Asia.

**Figure 4**

*China's Military Juxtaposition towards Asia*



Source: (Mankikar, 2024)



With the downfall of understanding between Europe and the USA, the EU will definitely search for another option in the thirst for advanced technology in the context of weapons. The following figures show that China has already enlisted its name in 4<sup>th</sup> position as the top exporters of weapons in the world.

**Figure 5**

*World's Top Weapons Exporter List*

Rank	Exporter	Share of global arms exports (%)		Per cent change from 2015–19 to 2020–24 <sup>a</sup>	Main recipients and their share of exporter's total exports (%), 2020–24				
		2020–24	2015–19		1st	2nd	3rd		
1	United States	43	35	21	Saudi Arabia	12	Ukraine	9.3	Japan
2	France	9.6	8.6	11	India	28	Qatar	9.7	Greece
3	Russia	7.8	21	-64	India	38	China	17	Kazakhstan
4	China	5.9	6.2	-5.4	Pakistan	63	Serbia	6.8	Thailand
5	Germany	5.6	5.7	-2.6	Ukraine	19	Egypt	19	Israel
6	Italy	4.8	2.0	138	Qatar	28	Egypt	18	Kuwait
7	United Kingdom	3.6	3.6	-1.4	Qatar	28	USA	16	Ukraine
8	Israel	3.1	3.2	-2.0	India	34	USA	13	Philippines
9	Spain	3.0	2.3	29	Saudi Arabia	24	Australia	18	Türkiye
10	South Korea	2.2	2.1	4.9	Poland	46	Philippines	14	India
11	Türkiye	1.7	0.8	103	UAE	18	Pakistan	10	Qatar
12	Netherlands	1.2	1.9	-36	USA	23	Pakistan	20	Mexico
13	Poland	1.0	<0.05	4 031	Ukraine	96	Sweden	1.4	Estonia
14	Sweden	0.9	0.5	73	Brazil	22	Pakistan	18	UAE
15	Norway	0.8	0.3	187	USA	28	Ukraine	21	Romania
16	Canada	0.6	0.6	2.6	Ukraine	30	Saudi Arabia	27	UAE
17	Australia	0.5	0.3	54	Chile	32	Canada	30	USA
18	Iran	0.4	0.1	749	Russia	80	Venezuela	11	Houthi rebels <sup>b</sup>
19	Switzerland	0.4	0.9	-61	Spain	24	Denmark	18	Romania
20	Ukraine	0.3	1.1	-72	China	67	India	15	Pakistan
21	UAE	0.3	0.4	-23	Jordan	28	Canada	20	Egypt
22	Czechia	0.3	0.4	-14	Ukraine	78	Viet Nam	9.5	Indonesia
23	Jordan	0.3	0.2	92	Ukraine	51	USA	43	Austria
24	Brazil	0.3	0.2	27	Portugal	25	France	22	Hungary
25	South Africa	0.3	0.3	-11	UAE	29	USA	21	India

Source: (SIPRI, [2025](#))

As China serves as the greatest competitor to U.S. global interests it would step up its efforts to expand its worldwide influence following Trump's return. The U.S. decline will enable China to advance its Belt and Road Initiative faster in new regions to grow political and economic power globally as America steps back from world affairs. The United States may lose its Asia-Pacific top status when China joins Russia in forming an intense geopolitical partnership (Kim, Aydıntaşbaş, & Varma, [2024](#)). The United States could lose its top position in global events because its influence would fade in organizations that decide major geopolitical matters. A strong U.S. leadership cannot be substituted by security organizations that many nations would create throughout their regions after losing American support. The European Union may choose to create its own military force while decreasing defense support from NATO and rejecting U.S. leadership in these projects. India and Australia work to lessen U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific region through promoting Quad projects and IPEF organization. Groups representing civil society internationally and other organizations will work against the U.S. departure from multilateral cooperation. Several nations in the Global South and other European states outside the U.S. and allies may work to fill the UN and WHO leadership gap left behind by American exit from these organizations. Non-state groups and NGO coalitions will push for worldwide teamwork across global issues with added results because of the U.S. role loss.

Under another Trump presidency nations including developing states would reassess their ties with the rest of the world's countries. These developing nations would start working with rising powers including China Russia and India since US foreign policies consistently favored American interests because the world is a witness to the rise of BRICS towards BRICS+ reciprocal rise of China as a superpower (Polychroniou, [2024](#); Cordesman, [2023](#)). According to international relations specialists, china has now the ability to declare itself as lord of the ring (word politics) (Danish, [2021](#)). Nations should consider making new regional partnerships or exploring fresh ways to trade and invest without depending mainly on US leadership. When Trump returns power players worldwide will stop adjusting the international



system to reduce American dominance. The US return would force specific nations to live within their power while global changes would diversify markets and set up new authority centers. Several nations would probably work alone to protect their interests as great power rivalry and shifting politics returned to global prominence.

## Conclusion

The future of power structures remains unknown because they seek entry. A possible Trump 2nd term presidency would lead to major global uncertainty and bad conditions for the world. A second Trump presidency will speed up the slow changes in global political power that began after the 2008 financial crisis while keeping his America First policies in place. The world faces more damage to multilateral cooperation along with decreasing international cooperation and weakening old military alliances during Donald Trump's presidency between the U.S. and the growing international powers of China and Russia. A new title for Trump will lead to more separation between world nations. The traditional international trade liberal order struggles to survive because of rising regional actors plus several other world power newcomers plus evolving global business patterns. Trump's methods of doing business outside his own country decreased global confidence in U.S. leadership. By winning another term in office these downward patterns would worsen making the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and climate talks less successful in achieving their goals. After the United States reduces its influence other nations will move into empty space to build separate international competition. In the times of Trump's presidency, the US is pulling away from resolving the issues globally and European and Asian countries that provide security concerning their regions should assume a bigger responsibility for safeguarding their areas.

From an elevated cost perspective, this shift in Europe would mean more independence in security matters and the resulting acceleration of the regional arms race for Asian nations such as Japan, South Korea, and India; U.S. Middle Eastern partners could create new defense formulas with Trump administration opposition or the portent of American defense withdrawal; and of course, the possibility of a strengthened NATO axis cannot be overlooked, which, apart from Russia, also includes Obama's strategic partner: Turkey. The discarding of support for human rights worldwide, as well as a rollback in democratic initiatives, would affect all aspects of national economic protection, as well as all matters of national security. Trump's disrespectful attitude toward universal behavioral norms and core democratic principles has strengthened authoritarian governments around the world and has almost convinced democratic advocacy to be ineffective outside of U.S. borders. As China and Russia have strategic partnerships with these regions, Eastern Europe, Africa, and some parts of Latin America would see more advancement of authoritarian movements in the case of a high-level retreat by the United States. During this period, Liberal democracy and authoritarianism will be more competitive. Support of democratic initiatives in the United States is essential to counter descents into authoritarian systems of leadership, as China spreads its model of great success to countries with which the system of Russia is fighting Western standards of democracy. Increased worldwide political instability would be sped up by a Trump administration because it refused to be an advocate for democratic progress and human rights beyond American borders. There will continue to be numerous disputes within its territory that will further result in weakening its ability to act in a consistent global foreign policy. Polarized foreign policy would constrain the U.S.'s influence overseas as an international leader. This will undermine confidence in the U.S. as a reliable partner when it comes to the unforeseeable and indeed dangerous patterns of American behavior under such circumstances.

Trump 2.0 leads to a presidency that will at least in the short term be an unexpectedly uncertain time period, and additionally to the rise of multipolarity because there will be fragments of extremely unstable competitive realms. China and Russia will initiate new power systems in global scope and in regions to counter earlier international standards. Nation states will start following the new leadership patterns of great powers and blocs, security threats, and disintegrate the U.S. diplomatic power and economic infrastructure. The future direction of world order depends on how interesting changes through Trump's policies resonate with international cooperation patterns given that the United States changes its attitude towards foreign engagement.

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